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This paper studies the e¤ects that the revelation of information on the electorates preferences
has on votersturnout. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences
induces a signicant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and only for
these electorates) the provision of information signicantly raises the participation of subjects
supporting the slightly larger team relative to the smaller team. We show that the heterogeneous
e¤ect of information on the participation of subjects in di¤erent teams is driven by the subjects
(incorrect) beliefs of casting a pivotal vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the probability of
casting a pivotal vote when they belong to the team with a slight majority, and choose the strategy
that maximizes their utility based on their inated probability assessment. Empirical evidence on
gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1990 and 2005 is consistent with our main experimental
result. Namely, we observe that the di¤erence in the actual vote tally between the party leading
according to the polls and the other party is larger than the one predicted by the polls only in
closely divided electorates. We provide a behavioral model that explains the main ndings of our
experimental and empirical analyses.
JEL Classication: C92, D72
Keywords: Experimental Study, Costly Voting, Polls.
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1. Introduction
In large electorates the probability of casting a pivotal vote is close to zero regardless of the actual
distribution of preferences. A poll pointing to an evenly split electorate, however, may a¤ect the
voters beliefs on the probability of casting a pivotal vote and, consequently, voters turnout.1
Indeed, a lively debate is being carried in several countries on whether or not polls a¤ect electoral
results. A fundamental di¢ culty when trying to empirically assess the causal e¤ect of public
opinion polls on votersturnout decisions is that of omitted variables. Several factors, like valence
characteristics of candidates and their chosen platforms, a¤ect not only individualsturnout but
also the public opinion polls.
This paper analyses experimentally and empirically the impact that the provision of information
on the electorates distribution of preferences has on votersturnout.2 Our experiment compares the
subjectsdecision to participate in an election when they know the exact distribution of preferences
of the electorate to their decisions when they only know their own preferences. Our objective
is to uncover any behavioral e¤ects that the provision of information may have on the voters.
Additionally, we collected, through a survey administered at the beginning and at the end of
our experiment, the subjectsestimated probabilities of casting a pivotal vote for all the di¤erent
distributions of preferences. This allow us to assess whether the subjectsbehavior is a consequence
of their beliefs or despite thereof.
1In the U.S. presidential elections of 2004, for example, individuals that supported Ralph Nader and resided in
states where the election was predicted to be close traded their votes with John Kerrys supporters that lived in
states where the election was expected to be lopsided in favor of one candidate. People that traded votes felt that
now their vote really counted.As related in votepair.org/stories: I live in Utah. The most republican state in
the nation. I happen to be a democrat who voted for Gore. My vote did not count because of the stupid electoral
college. By swapping my vote, I can nally have my vote count for a democrat.
2See Goeree and Großer (2005) and Taylor and Yildirim (2005) for recent theoretical studies of the e¤ects of
information on the electorates behavior.
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The experimental results show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a signicant
increase in turnout. This is consistent with results reported in the vast related empirical litera-
ture.3 Perhaps more surprisingly, in closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the
provision of information signicantly raises the participation of subjects supporting the slightly
larger team relative to the smaller team we refer to this behavior as the bandwagon e¤ect of polls.
This behavior contradicts the qualitative predictions of the unique quasi-symmetric equilibrium
of the theoretical model underlying the experiments. According to the equilibrium conditions the
provision of information on the electorates preferences should induce voters in the majority to
participate less frequently because they free ride on the voting of other individuals supporting
the same alternative. At the same time polls should stimulate the participation of voters in the
minority to o¤set the advantage of the other alternative. These requirements of the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium seem counter-intuitive and are not supported by the experimental data.4
To uncover the root causes behind the bandwagon e¤ect of polls we incorporate into the analy-
sis the subjectsresponses to the surveys. This analysis shows that the heterogeneous e¤ect of
information on subjectsturnout is driven by the subjects(incorrect) beliefs of casting a pivotal
vote. Simply put, subjects overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote when they belong
to the team with a slight majority, and choose the strategy that maximizes their utility based on
their inated probability assessment. This conjecture was rst formalized by Riker and Ordeshook
(1967). To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the rst attempt to formally test this
hypothesis.
3See Blais (2000), Feddersen (2004) and Merlo (2006) for recent surveys of the large existent literature on voters
turnout.
4A similar behavioral departure from mixed strategies Nash equilibrium was documented by Rapoport et al.
(2002) in an experimental study of market entry with asymmetric players.
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The observed bandwagon e¤ect of polls is consistent with previous experimental studies. While
studying the incidence of reform in the presence of individual-specic uncertainty, Cason and Mui
(2005) nd that the participation rates of the majority are higher than the participation rates
of the minority. Großer and Schram (2010) also conduct an experimental study of the e¤ects
of information on turnout. In particular, they examine the welfare implications of endogenous
voter participation using a di¤erent experimental design that includes oating voters. They also
nd that the majority participates more than the minority but this di¤erence is not statistically
signicant. Our experiment, like Cason and Mius (2005), is especially designed to use the subjects
as our unit of observation, granting us the possibility to di¤erentiate between distributions with
enough observations for each one to be able to perform statistically tests.
Finally, Levine and Palfrey (2005) experimentally test the predictions of Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1985) whereby participation costs are heterogeneous and privately known. They nd that subjects
in the small team vote with higher frequency than subjects in the large team. Unlike our experi-
mental design, theirs does not directly test for the e¤ects of the provision of information. Perhaps
more importantly, their study [as well as that of Großer and Schram (2010)] reveals the exact vote
tally at the end of each round thus allowing the subjects to gain experience and learn over rounds.
This was done in order to check whether the subjectsbehavior converges with experience to the
one predicted by the pure strategy equilibrium of the game they analyzed.
This papers objective is not to examine the predictions of a particular model, but rather to
reveal the individualsbehavioral reactions to the publication of public opinion polls. Therefore,
we use a random and anonymous reassignment procedure specically to reduce repeated game
incentives and minimize the e¤ects of learning. We believe this is the right experimental design
given the objectives of our study.
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We test the external validity of our main experimental result using a newly culled data set
on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1990 and 2005. For these purposes we use as our
proxy to closeness in the distribution of preferences the results of pre-election polls published by
newspapers within one week before the elections. The empirical evidence is consistent with the
experimental results. Namely, in elections where the polls pointed to a narrow margin between
the two parties, the di¤erence in the electionsvote share of the two parties is greater than the
di¤erence predicted by the polls. The e¤ect above is not present in electoral contests that were
expected to be lopsided according to the pollspredictions.
The individualsbehavioral pattern has signicant implications in two di¤erent contexts. The
immediate one is in the context of voting, where our results point to an interesting behavioral
phenomenon that has been overlooked by the related literature. This behavior has important
implications on the widespread policy debate on the desirability of publishing polls close to an
election date. On the one hand, supporters of the ban claim that the observed inclination of
people to vote for candidates leading in the surveys may lead to the manipulation of polls before
elections by parties with vested interests. On the other hand, opponents to the measure claim
that a ban on polls before elections suppresses the freedom of expression.5 Experimentally, we
show that the bandwagon e¤ect is a direct consequence of higher voter participation and not
necessarily of voters changing their preferences. This suggests that a policy geared to increase
votersparticipation can substantially o¤set the e¤ects of polls.6
The observed phenomenon has also broader implications regarding the empirical relevance of
5According to the Foundation for Information/ESOMAR a ban on the publication of opinion polls exists in 30
out of 66 countries surveyed in their study published in 2003. Nowadays, a lively debate is being conducted in
several countries, like Canada, France, Ireland, The Philippines and Russia.
6Klor and Winter (2007) perform a welfare analysis of the e¤ect of public opinion polls. We show that polls de-
crease the payo¤s of individuals in the small team without necessarily increasing the total welfare of the population.
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mixed strategy equilibria in more general setups. When a player can choose between two alterna-
tives she may use a mixed strategy only when she is indi¤erent between the two. In an asymmetric
environment as the one proposed here, players in the small team would be indi¤erent between
voting and abstaining only if players in the large team vote with a relatively lower frequency than
players of the small team. Moreover, each player should have the correct beliefs regarding the
mixed strategies used by the rest of the players. The equilibrium strategies (and beliefs) are not
necessarily intuitive, especially in setups with only slight di¤erences between the players. Thus, for
these conditions to hold behaviorally probably requires that the game is played with a considerable
amount of repetition to facilitate experience and learning.
We propose an alternative theoretical explanation that relaxes Nash equilibrium but is con-
sistent with the votersbeliefs and behavior observed in the laboratory. In particular, we show
that if individuals believe that in a close election the probability of voting is su¢ ciently high and
similar for every voter regardless of team sizes, then optimal behavior with respect to these beliefs
gives rise to voting patterns consistent with the ones observed in the current study. While these
beliefs cannot be part of equilibrium with groups of unequal sizes, they are consistent with the
documented departures from quasi-symmetric equilibrium strategies in other contexts as well.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework un-
derlying our experiment. A detailed description of our experimental design appears in Section 3.
Section 4 shows the main experimental results of the paper. Section 5 test the external validity
of our experimental results. We present an alternative theoretical explanation for the subjects
behavior in Section 6. The last section of the paper concludes. The proof of our theoretical result
appears in the appendix.
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2. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework we consider is based on the seminal contribution of Palfrey and Rosen-
thal (1983). There are n risk neutral individuals (n  3). Individuals have to decide between two
alternatives fA; Bg. The alternative is chosen via simple plurality rule; that is, the alternative
with the greater number of votes is chosen. In the event of a tie each alternative is selected with
equal probability. This is a collective choice problem: the chosen alternative applies to all the
individuals.
Each individual has preferences over the two alternatives. Let V denote the utility di¤erence
to an individual between the event that her favored alternative is elected and the event that the
other alternative wins the election.7 Each individual has to decide whether to vote or abstain.8
Let us denote by si the strategy of individual i (let si = 1 when individual i votes and si = 0
otherwise). All the individuals make their strategy choices simultaneously. There is a positive cost
C > 0 associated with the act of voting. V and C are common knowledge and identical to all the
individuals. We assume that V > 2C:
In this setup, a rational individual votes if and only if
V  P (1; sj 6=i)  C  V  P (0; sj 6=i);
where P denotes the probability that individual is preferred alternative is chosen and sj 6=i is a
7Therefore, individuals are splitted regarding their preferences and have opposing preferences over the two
possible outcomes. See Battaglini et al. (2010) and Houser et al. (2011) for experimental evidence on the e¤ect
that information on the state of the world has on votersdecisions.
8In the present framework voting against ones preferred alternative is strictly dominated by not voting. There-
fore, we rule out this possibility and, whenever we say that an individual votes, we imply that she votes in support
of her preferred alternative.
8
prole that describes the strategy of all the individuals excluding individual i:
Clearly, a rational individual participates in the election only if, given the other individuals
strategies, her participation a¤ects the probability that her preferred alternative is chosen. In
other words, an individual may turn out to vote only when she is pivotal.
We analyze the game above under two di¤erent frameworks regarding the individualsinfor-
mation about the distribution of preferences. The rst scenario focuses on a symmetric private
value model of voting. Accordingly, each voter knows the alternative that she favors and that the
probability that any other individual prefers any given alternative is the same for both alternatives.
The individualsprobability distributions are stochastically independent. We focus on symmetric
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) as the relevant equilibrium concept for this framework. This
equilibrium concept assumes that every individuals decision to participate is independent of the
alternative that she favors because of the symmetric common prior over the individualsdistri-
bution of preferences. That is, all the individuals randomize between voting for their preferred
alternative and abstaining with the same probability. (A formal denition appears in Appendix
A.)
In the second scenario the number of voters favoring each alternative is commonly known. This
is the framework analyzed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). This complete information game has
multiple Nash equilibria. The solution concept that generates unique predictions for the game
is that of totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (QSNE). According to this
equilibrium concept all the individuals supporting the same alternative use the same strategy.
This strategy involves voting with a probability strictly between zero and one. Note that, unlike
the BNE, in the QSNE individuals supporting di¤erent alternatives are not necessarily mixing
with the same probability. (See Appendix A for a formal denition of this equilibrium concept.)
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For the purposes of our experimental study we focus on electorates of seven individuals and
set V = 10 and C = 4: We choose an odd number of participants in each electorate to rule
out equilibrium in pure strategies (except for the case where all the participants share the same
preferences). In fact, there exists a unique totally mixed QSNE and a unique totally mixed
symmetric BNE with electorates of seven players choosing between two alternatives. Table 1
provides the point predictions for the unique BNE and QSNE.
Note that according to the predictions of the QSNE, individuals in the minority vote with
higher probability than individuals in the majority for every distribution of preferences. This
result is a direct consequence of the mixed strategies equilibriums requirement that individuals
should be indi¤erent between voting and abstaining. Since individuals are willing to vote only if
the probability of casting a pivotal vote is positive, they have to expect that with a high enough
probability the number of votes in support for each team would be equal, or di¤er by only one
vote. To satisfy that requirement individuals supporting the large team should vote with lower
probability than individuals supporting the small team.
3. Experimental Design
The experiment was run at the RatioLab - The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision
Theory at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The 84 subjects in this experiment were recruited
from the pool of undergraduate and graduate students from The Hebrew University and had no
previous experience in experiments related to votersparticipation.
In each session 21 subjects participated as voters. The experiments were conducted via com-
puters. Before the experiment started an experimental administrator read the instructions aloud.
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We also asked several hypothetical questions at the end of the instructions to check subjects
comprehension of the procedure (the instructions and the questionnaire are located in Appendix
B). The experiment began after all subjects had solved all questions successfully. The experiment
lasted for about ninety minutes. Each subject received 80 tokens as a participation fee and subse-
quent earnings according to the payo¤s specied in the experiment. Average earnings were equal
to 244 tokens. We converted each token to NIS 0.25 and paid the subjects in cash in private at
the end of the session.9 Throughout the experiment we ensured anonymity and e¤ectively isolated
each subject in a cubicle to minimize any interpersonal inuence that could stimulate uniformity
of behavior. Communication among subjects was not allowed throughout the session.
Each experimental session entailed 20 independent rounds. In each round we randomly divided
21 subjects into three electorates of seven participants each. At the beginning of each round an
equal probability rule randomly assigned each subject to one of two teams: Green or Blue. A
subject earns 10 tokens if the team she prefers is selected by majority voting in an election. Voting
entails a cost of 4 tokens.
The sequence of events is as follows. Subjects know that the round is divided into two stages,
and that each subject will decide whether to vote or abstain in each stage. Every subject knows
that her decision in one stage is independent from her decision in the other stage. In the rst stage
of each round each subject knows only her preferred color. She decides whether to vote or abstain.
After all the participants make their decisions we proceed to the second stage of the round. In this
stage subjects are told the electorates distribution of preferences. Subjects receive no information
whatsoever on the participation of subjects in the rounds rst stage. Subjects have to decide
9Subjects on average earned NIS 61 for roughly 90 minutes of their time. The hourly minimum wage in Israel
is slightly below NIS 20. The current exchange rate is slightly above NIS 3.5 per U.S. dollar.
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again whether or not to vote. After all the subjects choose an action, they learn the selected teams
of the rst and second elections, their corresponding payo¤s for the round, and their cumulative
payo¤s no information is provided on the number of subjects that voted for a given team. Ties
are always broken by an equal probability rule. At the end of each round subjects are randomly
reshu­ ed between electorates and each subjects preferred color is again randomly chosen.
In addition to playing this game each subject completed a survey that asked her to assess the
probability of casting a pivotal vote for each possible team size. Every subject completed the same
survey twice, before the beginning of the rst round and after nishing the last round.
4. Experimental Results
This section presents the e¤ects of revealing information about the electorates distribution of
preferences on the subjects turnout. To clarify the exposition we divide this section into two
subsections. The rst subsection presents the basic results on the impact of information provision
on subjectsparticipation. The second subsection reports the results taking into account not only
the subjectsactions but also their beliefs.
For all the tests reported below the unit of observation is the subject. For the nonparametric
tests we consider, for each subject, the average across all the di¤erent rounds. This eliminates
possible correlations across repeated observations of a given subject. Therefore, the statistics
reported are averages of the subjectsaverages. In the regression analysis, however, we use all the
available data, adopting a random e¤ects specication with the subject as the random factor.
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4.1. The E¤ect of Information on SubjectsTurnout
Figure 1 depicts the average turnout rate before the provision of information and the average
turnout rate after information is revealed, as a function of the di¤erent distribution of preferences.
The gure also includes the equilibriums predicted turnout rate.
The gure indicates that a close division of preferences induces a signicant increase in turnout.
Whereas the average turnout rate before the provision of information is slightly below 25 percent,
the average turnout rate for a distribution of teams of sizes three and four is 40 percent (the
di¤erence between the two is statistically signicant with z = 3:125; p < 0:001; two-sided sign test
using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution).
The provision of information for other divisions of the electorates does not have a signicant
impact on the subjectsturnout relative to their turnout rates before the provision of information
(p > 0:8 when the division of teams is ve versus two; p > 0:65 when the division is six versus
one; and p > 0:8 when the division is seven versus zero, all according to a two-sided sign test).
Moreover, the observed rates are not substantially di¤erent from the equilibriums prediction. The
turnout rate is higher than the equilibriums prediction for distributions of seven versus zero and
ve versus two, whereas turnout is lower than the equilibriums prediction for a distribution of six
versus one. For closely divided preferences, on the contrary, we observe important quantitative
di¤erences between the subjectsturnout and the predictions of the theoretical model underlying
the experiment.10
10The correlation between closeness and turnout observed in the laboratory is consistent with results in the related
empirical literature [see, for example, Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999)]. Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) show that this
correlation can be explained using a model where voters have ethical preferences. Coate and Conlin (2004) provide
empirical evidence supporting the ethical voters approach. See also Degan and Merlo (2011) for an extension of
the model of ethical voting to a unied approach that combines voter uncertainty and spatial heterogeneity of
preferences.
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Although Figure 1 reveals a clear and signicant e¤ect of closeness on participation, the gure
masks important and unexpected di¤erences between teams for a given distribution of preferences.
The heterogeneous e¤ect of closeness between teams is presented in Figure 2, which decomposes
turnout as a function of the size of the teams. Note that a team of size j implies that the
distribution of the electorates preferences is (j; 7  j):
This gure shows the most startling e¤ect that emerges from our experiment: For closely
divided electorates the e¤ect of information on voter participation is not homogenous across teams
of di¤erent sizes. In particular, the provision of information signicantly raises the participation
of voters supporting the slightly larger team relative to the participation of voters supporting the
smaller team, thus a¤ecting the elections results.
In other words, for closely divided electorates revealing information on subjectspreferences
causes an important increase on the participation of all the subjects. Subjects that belong to teams
of size three and four vote more often after learning the distribution of preferences. This e¤ect
is signicantly stronger for subjects that belong to the slightly larger team. The turnout rate for
subjects that belong to a team with four supporters is more than twenty percent higher than the
turnout rate of subjects that belong to a team of three members. This behavior contradicts the
quantitative and qualitative predictions of the theoretical model. Accordingly, members of the
minority should vote with a higher probability than the members of the majority to o¤set the
advantage of the majority. Moreover, the provision of information should induce a decrease in the
turnout rate of the majority because of free riding of its members.
We do not observe a similar e¤ect for electorates with a more lopsided division of preferences.
For electorates that are not closely divided, revealing the distribution of preferences does not
a¤ect the turnout rate of subjects supporting the small team but lowers the turnout of subjects
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supporting the large team. For example, we see an important decrease in the participation of
subjects after learning that they belong to a team of size seven. A similar phenomenon occurs
for subjects that belong to a team of six subjects. Note that these subjects turn out in a lower
frequency than that of a subject that is the sole supporter of an alternative. An analogous situation
occurs when the subjectspreferences are divided between teams of ve and two members. This
behavior, which seems to be a consequence of free riding, is in accordance with the equilibriums
predictions.
The di¤erent e¤ect of closeness on subjects conditional on the size of the team they support is
evident from the estimation of the following participation equation:
V ote_Infi;t = 1 f0 + 1V ote_NoInfi;t + 2Majorityi;t + 3roundt + i = 0g (4.1)
where 1fg is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the left hand side of the inequality
inside the brackets is greater than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise; V ote_Infi;t reects subject
is participation decision in the second stage of round t after the provision of information on the
distribution of preferences. The covariates account for the subjects decision in the rst stage
of round t before the provision of information (V ote_NoInfi;t), and whether or not the subject
belongs to the large team in an electoral contest (Majorityi;t). We also include in the analysis
a time trend (roundt) to capture the fact that subjects may systematically change their strategy
as a consequence of learning from round to round; and a subject specic constant e¤ect (i) that
captures random disturbances (constant through time) that characterize subject i:
We estimate equation (4.1) separately for each di¤erent distribution of subjectspreferences
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using a random e¤ects probit estimation.11 Table 2 presents the estimated coe¢ cients. The table
quanties the most striking of our results: When the electorate is closely divided, the provision
of information on subjects preferences signicantly raises the participation of subjects in the
majority relative to the minority. The team size e¤ect when the electorate is divided into teams of
three versus four subjects is positive, large in value relative to the other coe¢ cients and statistically
signicant. It increases the probability of voting by slightly over 10 percent for the average subject.
We also observe a signicant negative e¤ect of rounds, pointing to a learning process that induces
subjects to reduce their participation in elections.12 Interestingly, the subjectsparticipation in
the rst stage of each round does not explain their actions after the provision of information.
The subjectsbehavior is qualitatively di¤erent when the di¤erence in the number of supporters
for each team is relatively large. When the di¤erence in the number of supporters is of three or ve
subjects the provision of information does not a¤ect the participation of subjects in the majority
any di¤erently than it a¤ects the participation of subjects in the minority. For these distributions
of preferences, moreover, the number of rounds elapsed does not a¤ect participation.
Contrary to closely divided groups, when the di¤erence in the number of supporters for each
team is relatively large the best predictor for subjectsturnout after the provision of information
is the subjectsactions in the rst stage of each round. There are subjects that reveal a preference
for participation in the rst stage, and they are the ones turning out to vote in the second stage
when the electorates preferences are not closely divided. This seems to be particularly the case in
lopsided contests (6 versus 1) where the coe¢ cient of the rst stage decision is highly statistically
11A similar estimation strategy was used in an experimental context by Frechette et al. (2003). That studys
main focus is the analysis of the impact of open versus closed amendment rules in models of bargaining.
12We test the same model including the interaction between majority and number of rounds as an additional
covariate. The coe¢ cient for this covariate is not signicant. This means that the signicant di¤erences between
majority and minority does not disappear over rounds.
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signicant and also large in value relative to the other coe¢ cients. The probability of voting in
the second stage is 30 percent higher for the average subject that belongs to a team of size one
and voted in the rst stage relative to the average subject that did not vote in the rst stage. The
marginal e¤ect of voting in the rst stage on the probability of voting in the second stage is 24
percent for subjects in teams of size 6.
The fact that the provision of information signicantly raises the participation of subjects in
the majority relative to the minority in closely divided electorates contradicts the intuitions behind
the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium concept. It also contradicts some of the intuitions behind
the alternative quantal response equilibrium concept. Interestingly, however, the quantal response
equilibrium predicts that the observed participation rate should be higher (lower) than that pre-
dicted by the Nash equilibrium when the participation rate predicted by the Nash equilibrium is
below (above) 0.5 (Goeree and Holt, 2005). This prediction is borne out by the data both before
and after the provision of information. This prediction nds additional support in the next section
where we analyze the subjectsbeliefs.
4.2. The E¤ect of SubjectsBeliefs on Their Turnout Decisions
This subsection incorporates into the analysis the surveysanswers to better account for the sub-
jectsstrategies. As already pointed out, these surveys, conducted at the beginning and at the
end of the experiment, asked every subject to quantify the probability of casting a pivotal vote
for every possible distribution of preferences. Theoretically, the equilibrium probability of casting
a pivotal vote depends only on 2C=V; the voting cost divided by half the benets of a victory of
the subjects preferred alternative. Given that we hold both constant, the equilibriums predicted
probability of casting a pivotal vote is constant as well regardless of the distribution of preferences.
17
(In our application, with a benet of 10 tokens and a cost of 4 tokens, this probability is equal to
0.8).
Figure 3 depicts the average subjectsbeliefs of casting a pivotal vote as a function of the size
of the team. The gure includes the results of the survey taken at the beginning (labeled Survey 1
in the gure) and at the end of the experiment (Survey 2). This gure also includes the frequencies
of elections in which at least one subject was pivotal based on the other subjects actual behavior.
Figure 3 shows that subjects grossly miscalculate the probability of casting a pivotal vote.
Quantitatively, the subjects state a probability much lower than the theoretical and actual prob-
abilities. Qualitatively, subjectsbeliefs seem to be strongly a¤ected by the distribution of pref-
erences. A low probability is attributed to situations with a large di¤erence in the number of
supporters between the two teams, whereas the probability shows an important increase for closely
divided teams. On average, the subjects stated a probability of 36.14% (with a standard deviation
of 21.41%) of casting a pivotal vote when the di¤erence between the teams is one. The stated
probability decreases to 25.54% and 20.48% as the di¤erences in team sizes increases to three and
ve respectively (the corresponding standard deviations are 17.53% and 18.01%). For teams of
size seven the reported probability is 23.04% (the standard deviation is 27.08%). The subjects
estimates for a close distribution of preferences is signicantly di¤erent than their estimates for
the rest of the distributions (p < 0:001).13
It follows from the previous subsection (see Figure 2) that not only the subjectsbeliefs of
casting a pivotal vote are relatively higher for closely divided electorates, but also their propensity
to vote increases for these electorates. As a consequence, the actual probability of casting a pivotal
13The probability stated for distributions with a division of two versus ve is signicantly di¤erent than that
reported for distributions of one versus six (p < 0:001). Neither series is signicantly di¤erent from the probabilities
reported for teams of size seven (p = 0:28 and 0:18; respectively).
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vote decreases in closely divided electorates. Hence, an increase in the subjectsbeliefs of casting
a pivotal vote brings about a decrease in the actual probability of being pivotal.
For a given distribution of preferences, the subjects believe that they are more likely to cast
a pivotal vote when they belong to the larger team.14 Contrary to our results from the previous
section, the di¤erences are statistically signicant for every distribution of preferences. The p-value
that subjects in the majority state a higher probability of casting a pivotal vote than subjects in
the minority is below 0.04 for a distribution of four versus three subjects. This value decreases to
0.03 and to 0.003 as the di¤erence between the teams increases to three and ve, respectively.15
A comparison of the subjectsbeliefs and their participation decisions leads us to conjecture
that the subjectsbehavior is at least partially accounted by their beliefs. Simply put, subjects
may overestimate the likelihood of casting a pivotal vote and act rationally based on their inated
probability assessment. To test this hypothesis we estimate equation (4.1) replacing Majorityi;t,
the explanatory variable that captured the relative e¤ect of belonging to the majority, by each
subjects beliefs of casting a pivotal vote conditional on the size of the subjects team.
The estimated coe¢ cients appear on the second panel of Table 2. The results are qualitatively
similar to the ones presented on the rst panel of the table; that is, subjects beliefs explain
their behavior only when the distribution of preferences is closely divided between the two teams.
Intuitively, in close elections subjects believe that there is a higher probability of casting a pivotal
vote when they belong to the majority. These beliefs lead subjects to increase their relative
frequency of voting when they indeed belong to the large group. Quantitatively, the coe¢ cient
14In the only exception, subjects in the second survey assigned a higher probability of casting a pivotal vote to a
team of size one (25.02%) than to a team of size six (21.48%).
15All the conclusions above are reached using each subjects average of both surveys for a given team size. Note
that the subjectsanswers to the surveys are not signicantly di¤erent for any team size, and our results do not
change if we use either survey instead of the subjectsaverage of the two surveys.
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for the subjectsbeliefs is smaller than the coe¢ cient estimated in panel (1). In particular, a ten
percentage point increase in the belief of casting a pivotal vote when belonging to a team of size
four causes a ve percent increase in the probability of voting of the average subject.
When the sizes of the teams are not closely divided the subjectsbeliefs do not play a signicant
role in their decision to participate. In these situations, as was concluded before, the best predictor
for a subjects participation in the second stage of a round is the subjects action in the rst stage
of the round.
The next section tests the external validity of our main experimental observation using data
from gubernatorial elections in the U.S.
5. Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in the US
This sections exercise is mainly intended to assess the external validity of our main experimental
result. Using a newly culled data set on gubernatorial elections in the U.S. we test whether, in
close elections, the di¤erence in the actual vote tally between the party slightly leading according
to the polls and the other party is larger than the one predicted by the polls. This hypothesis
emanates directly from our experimental results and, to the best of our knowledge, has never been
addressed in the vast extant empirical literature on voter turnout.
For the purposes of our empirical exercise we use as our proxy for closeness in the distribution
of preferences the results of pre-election polls on gubernatorial races in the U.S., between 1990 and
2005. These polls, conducted by an independent polling rm (Mason-Dixon Polling and Research,
Inc.), were published by newspaper media within one week before the elections.16 The polls are
16According to Matsusaka and Palda (1993, p. 861) the ideal measure would be survey predictions from opinion
polls taken the day before the election.Our data come very close to that ideal.
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supposed to be extremely accurate. They are published right before the elections and report
results based only on likely voters. Therefore, the polls already incorporate other factors that
a¤ect participation (e.g. candidatesspending and mobilizationse¤ects). Hence, any systematic
di¤erence between the polls and the electoral results may be attributed, at least partially, to
e¤ects that the poll has on the electorate e¤ects that were not taken into account by the polling
company.
Our data set consists of 143 gubernatorial elections in 47 states. These are all the elections
between 1990 and 2005 where Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc. conducted a public opinion
poll within one week before the elections and where a third party did not receive more than 30
percent of the elections votes.
The main two variables of interest are the di¤erences in the vote share for the leading party
minus the vote share for the trailing party according to the polls, and the electoral results. Let us
denote by
DP = Lp   Tp
the di¤erence in the vote share of the leading and trailing parties according to the polls, and denote
by
DE = Le   Te
the corresponding di¤erence between the two parties according to the electoral results.17 Our
exercise focuses on deviations of the electoral results from the polls predictions, DE   DP; and
how these deviations correlate with the size of DP:
17For a given election the classication of the parties as leading or trailing is xed. Therefore, DP is always
positive whereas DE may be negative if the winner of the election is the party trailing in the published public
opinion poll. This occurs for 11 observations in our sample.
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Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables of interest. The table di¤erentiates be-
tween elections where the di¤erence in the support between the two parties according to the polls
was less than 10 percentage points and the rest of the elections.18 The table illustrates rst of
all that the polls predictions are indeed accurate. The rst column shows that the average di¤er-
ence predicted by the polls between the two parties is 14.8 percentage points whereas the average
di¤erence according to the electoral results is 15.3 percentage points. That is, the average error
of the polls is 0.5 percentage points. The second and third columns highlight the main di¤erence
between closely divided electorates and the rest. On average, DE   DP is positive for elections
expected to be close and negative for the rest of the elections. Furthermore, the absolute average
value of DE DP is higher for closely divided electorates than for the rest of the electorates even
though the latter set of elections has a higher standard deviation. This show that on average the
polls provide a more accurate prediction of the results for lopsided divided electorates.
Figure 4 depicts DE   DP on the vertical axis and DP on the horizontal axis. The gure
includes the resulting curve according to the predicted value of DE DP based on the estimation
of a fractional polynomial of DP; along with the condence interval of the mean (calculated using
robust standard errors). The scatter plot exhibits a pattern consistent with our experimental
results. Accordingly, for polls pointing to a narrow margin between the candidates we observe a
bandwagon e¤ect, whereby supporters of the leading candidate increase their participation relative
to supporters of the trailing candidate.19 This is the case for polls predicting a di¤erence smaller
than 22 percentage points between the two parties. The bandwagon e¤ect is particularly strong for
18The chosen cuto¤ of 10 percent is the level of closeness that emerges endogenously from the analysis below.
19One may think that the publication of the poll may not only a¤ect votersturnout but their preferences as well.
Since we restrict our attention to polls published within one week of the actual elections we believe that this e¤ect
is not of an important magnitude.
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values of DP between 4 and 10 percentage points. In this range DE  DP is statistically greater
than zero at the 2.5% signicance level.20
In electoral contests that are expected to be one-sided the above e¤ect is not present. For these
contests the predicted value of DE   DP is decreasing as the di¤erence in the support for the
two parties according to the polls increases. As predicted by the theoretical models, free riding
of supporters of the large party seems to be behind the negative slope of DE   DP in lopsided
divided electorates.
We obtain similar conclusions from the estimation of a random-e¤ects regression model that
controls for additional covariates that may a¤ect DE   DP: The main covariate of interest is a
dummy variable, dubbed Close, for elections where DP < 0:1:21 In addition, the regression below
includes three dummy variables. The rst one, Pres, accounts for gubernatorial elections held
concurrently with presidential elections. This variable help us control for possible e¤ects that
presidential elections may have on voterspreferences and turnout. The second dummy variable,
Inc, is for incumbent governors running for reelection, and the third one for elections where the
leading candidate according to the polls belonged to the Democratic party (Dem). These variables
aim to control for any systematic advantage that incumbents may have in their get-out-the-vote
operations, or any systematic di¤erence in these operations between Democrats and Republicans.
The estimated coe¢ cients appear below with standard errors, clustered at the state level, in
20If we restrict the estimation to be linear, DE  DP is statistically greater than zero at the 2.5% signicance
level for every value of DP lower than 0.1.
21We choose to dene an election as close when DP < 0:1 based on the results of Figure 4. Our results do not
change qualitatively or quantitatively when we use di¤erent denitions of close elections.
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parentheses.












2 = 0:1266; N = 143
The results indicate that the polls systematically underestimated the electoral advantage of the
leading candidate only in elections expected to be close. On the contrary, the di¤erence between
the electoral outcomes and the pollspredictions is not statistically di¤erent from zero in the rest
of the elections.
Summing up, the evidence presented above is consistent with our experimental results. An
important caveat is in order. We need to stress that the empirical analysis is correlational in
nature. This analysis cannot, by itself, establish causality or inform us about the magnitude of
the bandwagon e¤ect of polls. We present this empirical evidence simply because, when combined
with the experimental results, it strengthens the case for the existence of a bandwagon e¤ect of
public opinion polls in closely divided electorates.
6. A Behavioral Model
Our main experimental results, conrmed using data on gubernatorial elections, cannot be ac-
counted by the traditional rational choice approach to turnout. The results therefore call for an
alternative behavioral explanation.
An alternative specication of the votersutility function may help explain part of the behavior
observed in the laboratory. According to the traditional approach each voters benet and cost of
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participation are not a¤ected by whether the voter is in the losing or winning side of the contest.
Several papers, mainly interested in models of sequential voting, modify the votersutility function
to take into account the fact that voters experience a desire to vote for the winner (on top of
the costs and benets explicit in rational choice models).22 This approach, while able to explain
bandwagons, assumes that the very behavior we need to explain is good for the voters. Additionally,
the approach does not account for the stark di¤erence observed in the votersbehavior between
elections expected to be close and the rest of the elections.
This section proposes an alternative approach that relaxes Nash equilibrium but is consistent
with the votersbeliefs and behavior observed in the laboratory. The Nash equilibrium concept
requires that players optimize with respect to beliefs which are consistent with the actual strategies
of players. As already pointed out, no such combination can support the behavior we observe in
our ndings. Our experimental results may be consistent with a weaker notion of rationality. Are
there reasonablebeliefs that we can attribute to voters under which votersbest responses will
be akin to the observed behavior (without these beliefs being consistent with the actual voters
strategies)?
Herein we present a set of reasonable beliefs which satisfy these conditions. If voters believe that
in a close election the probability of voting is similar for all the individuals and those probabilities
are su¢ ciently high, then optimal behavior with respect to these beliefs gives rise to voting patterns
consistent with the ones documented in the previous sections. Formally,
Proposition 1: Suppose individuals believe that voters in the majority vote with probability
22Borgers (2004) mentions this possibility in a simultaneous voting game similar to the one we analyze here.
Callander (2004) models this possibility explicitly in a sequential voting game by adding a positive parameter to
a voters utility function when the voter supports the winning alternative. See Morton and Williams (1999) and
Battaglini et al. (2005) for experimental studies of sequential voting games.
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q and voters in the minority vote with probability r; with jq   rj < "; for some su¢ ciently small
" > 0: If r  1=2 the probability of casting a pivotal vote is higher for a voter in the majority than
for a voter in the minority.
To illustrate the intuition behind the proposition let us consider the case of a closely divided
electorate when individuals believe that r is close to one. In this case, an individual that supports
the large team believes it is very likely that her vote may break a tie. On the contrary, an individual
that supports the small team believes that her team will loose the election regardless of her choice.
Thus, under the conditions of Proposition 1 individuals believe that there is a higher probability of
casting a pivotal vote when they support the large team. This result is consistent with the beliefs
stated by the subjects in their answers to the surveys.23
The main condition behind Proposition 1 is the individualsbeliefs that all voters mix with
similar probabilities. Although these beliefs cannot be part of equilibrium with groups of unequal
sizes, they seem reasonable when the preferences of the electorate are almost equally split between
the two alternatives. This may explain why the bandwagon e¤ect of polls occurs only when the
electorate is closely divided.
7. Conclusions
This paper studies the e¤ect that information on the votersdistribution of preferences has on
turnout. The main nding is that the observed increase in turnout when the distribution of
preferences is closely divided is heterogenous across teams of di¤erent sizes. In particular, the
increase in turnout is signicantly larger for the alternative with a slight majority according to
23The subjectsbeliefs are similar to a "level-1" individual best responding to "level-0" individuals in the theo-
retical framework developed by Crawford and Iriberri (2007).
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the poll. That is, polls cause a bandwagon e¤ect whereby the frontrunner alternative increases its
relative support in the elections. This e¤ect, observed only in close elections, is not a consequence
of voters changing their preferences. Rather, it is entirely driven by individuals that already
supported the leading team voting with a relatively higher frequency.
We showed that the bandwagon e¤ect of polls in closely divided electorates is a direct conse-
quence of the subjectsbeliefs. That is, for closely divided electorates we observe that subjects
overestimate the probability of casting a pivotal vote and behave according to those beliefs. On
the contrary, subjectsbeliefs do not explain their actions in electorates that are lopsided divided.
Rather, only subjects that voted with high frequencies regardless of their beliefs or the distribu-
tion of preferences are the ones that participate in lopsided elections. This paper documented the
bandwagon e¤ect not only in the laboratory but also using data from U.S. gubernatorial elections
in the last fteen years.
It is noteworthy that the bandwagon e¤ect cannot be accounted by the intuitions derived
from theoretical models that study the e¤ect of public opinion polls on turnout. Those intuitions
are based on rational individuals holding the correct beliefs for every distribution of preferences.
Hereby we proposed an alternative explanation consistent with the votersbeliefs and behavior
observed in the laboratory. In particular, we presented a set of reasonable beliefs that can be
attributed to voters under which utility maximization yields a behavioral pattern consistent with
the bandwagon e¤ect of polls in closely divided electorates.
Summing up, this paper discovered an anomalous behavioral pattern in the laboratory; it cor-
roborated the external validity of this behavior for large electorates; and it presented an alternative
rationale for the prevalence of bandwagon e¤ects in close elections. Clearly, much work remains
to be done for us to be able to understand what causes this e¤ect. Currently, we are exploring
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the prevalence of this e¤ect in general environments. It seems that subjects do not fully take
into account information on an ex-post asymmetric distribution in environments that are ex-ante
symmetric. This conjecture, if validated in the laboratory, has implications far beyond the context
of votersturnout.
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Appendix A
Denition of Totally Mixed Strategies Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Let
us denote by nA the number of voters that prefer alternative A and nB the number of voters that
prefer alternative B, with nA+nB = n: A totally mixed strategies symmetric BNE in this context


















































denotes the probability that a voter that supports alternative A is pivotal when the rest of the






















denotes the probability that a voter that supports alternative B is pivotal when the rest of the
voters vote with probability : Thus, conditions (A.1) and (A.2) state that a voting probability 
is a totally mixed symmetric BNE if and only if every individual is indi¤erent between voting and
abstaining.
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Denition of Totally Quasi-Symmetric Mixed Strategies Nash Equilibrium: As
dened by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, p. 27), a pair of voting strategies (A; B) is a totally















































i+1A (1  A)nA 1 iiB(1  B)nB 1 i
where the right hand side of (A.3) is simply the probability that a voter supporting alternative
A is pivotal when the rest of the voters supporting A vote with probability A and all the voters
supportingB vote with probability B. Similarly, the right hand side of (A.4) is the probability that
a voter supporting alternative B is pivotal when all the voters supporting A vote with probability
A and the rest of the voters supporting B vote with probability B. Therefore, (A.3) states a
su¢ cient and necessary condition for A to be a best response to B and (A.4) states a su¢ cient
and necessary condition for B to be a best response to A.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us assume that there are n voters, with n > 3 and odd. Let us
say that nA of the voters prefer alternative A and nB of them prefer alternative B; with nA+nB = n
and nA < nB: Assume rst that r = q: The probability that an individual that prefers alternative
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where the rst term is the probability of observing a tie and the second term is the probability
that alternative A loses the election by one vote. Similarly, the probability that an individual that





















Therefore, rearranging terms we can express the probability that an individual supporting B will

















q2nA(1  q)n 1 2nA : (A.7)











(nB   1  i)q
2i+1(1  q)n 2(i+1): (A.8)
Thus, the probability of casting a pivotal vote is greater when an individual supports the majority











(nB   1  i)q
2i+1(1  q)n 1 2(i+1) [q   (1  q)] > 0:
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This inequality is satised if, and only if, q > 1=2: The more general result for r 6= q with
jq   rj < "; for some " > 0 follows immediately from the fact that the probability of casting a
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Figure 4: Deviation of Electoral Results (DE) from Polls Predictions (DP) for 


















0.0873 0.0708 0.1399 0.0365
0.1229 0.2400 0.8601
Probability that a supporter of the large team votes according to the 
unique QSNE
Probability that a supporter of the small team votes according to the 
unique QSNE
2 vs. 5 1 vs. 6 0 vs. 7
Table 1
Theoretical Predictions for the Two Different Frameworks with Benefits of Winning Equal to 10 and Costs of Voting Equal to 4. 
Distribution of Preferences 3 vs. 4
Probability of voting according to the unique BNE 0.0807
Distribution of Preferences
Constant -0.522 *** -1.039 *** -1.030 *** -0.740 *** -0.977 *** -1.446 ***
First Stage Voting Decision 0.207 0.342 * 0.921 *** 0.232 0.360 * 0.954 ***
Round -0.020 *** -0.002 -0.002 -0.020 *** -0.002 -0.004
Majority 0.305 *** 0.175 -0.339



























The effect of majority on turnout The effect of beliefs on turnout





Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate Random Effect Probit panel regression model in which the dependent variable is 
the voting decision of subjects in the second stage. t -statistics are in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level,  ** indicates 
statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
(0.004) (0.005)
Table 2
Random Effect Probit Estimates of Voting Decisions in the Second Stage (Standard errors in Parentheses)
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84 84 72




















Sources: Polls' data obtained from Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc. 
Accuracy of the Polls 
(DE – DP)
Number of Observations
Difference in Vote Share between Leading and Trailing Party according 
to Elections (DE)
Difference in Vote Share between Leading and Trailing Party according 
to Polls (DP)
Table 3
Average Difference in Vote Share between Leading and Trailing Party according to Polls and Elections, 1990 – 2005
   (Standard deviations in parentheses)
Elections Expected to be Close
(DP  < 0.10)
Elections Not Expected to be Close 
 (DP ≥ 0.10)All Elections
